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STA UB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL
AND THE
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Elizabeth Reburn *
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of cat's paw liability derives from a children's fable dating
back to the 1600s. In the fable, a cat and a monkey are friends. 2 One
day, sitting by the fire, they see some chestnuts roasting and become
determined to eat them.3 Not wanting to bum his own paw, the monkey
convinces the cat to reach into the fire and get the nuts, telling the cat he
would divide them up once they were out.4  As the cat pulled the
chestnuts out of the fire, burning its paws as it went, the monkey ate all
of the chestnuts, leaving none for the cat. 5
In 1990, Judge Richard Posner applied the theory of the cat's paw to a
case that arose in employment discrimination. 6 Within the employment
discrimination context, when "a biased individual takes an action against
another person based on a protected trait, but an unbiased individual
ultimately makes the challenged employment decision[,]" this is known
as "cat's paw" liability. 7 In 2011, seeking to resolve a circuit split, 8 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of cat's paw liability in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital.9 Rather than providing clarification, however, the
Court "opened the proverbial can of worms, leaving a number of
* I would like to thank Professor Sandra Sperino at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law for providing her thoughts and comments on this article, during both the topic selection and editing
stages.
1. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011); see also Julie M. Covel, The Supreme
Court Writes a Fractured Fable of the Cat's Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186
(2011), 51 WASHBURN L. J. 159, 159 (2011).
2. Aesopica: Aesop's Fables in English, Latin & Greek, The Monkey and the Cat,
MYTHICFOLKLORE.NET, http://mythfolklore.net/aespoica/milowinter/61 .html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Aesopica].
3. Aesopica, supra note 2.
4. Id. See also Covel, supra note 1, at 159.
5. Aesopica, supra note 2; see also Covel, supra note 1, at 159.
6. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011); see also Covel, supra note 1, at 159
("In 1990 La Fontain's fable took on expanded meaning when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit used it as a means of explaining the unusual circumstances that had formed the basis for an
employer's age discrimination lawsuit against his employer in Shager v. Upjohn Company.").
7. Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, The Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2013).
8. Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
9. See Staub, 562 U.S. 411; see also Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
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unresolved questions about its scope." 10
A number of these questions relate to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).11 In the years since Staub, lower courts have
differed in their interpretation of the holding given by the Court, and
have struggled to apply the doctrine of proximate cause to cat's paw
cases arising under the ADEA. 12  This Casenote discusses these
differing interpretations, and seeks to solve an area of legal turmoil.
Part II of this Casenote introduces Staub v. Proctor Hospital. It then
provides a brief discussion on the construction of the causation standard
included in the ADEA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this
construction in Gross v. FBL Financial Services. Finally, Part II
discusses the various attempts of the circuits to apply the rule in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital to cat's paw cases arising under the ADEA. Part III
discusses the federal courts highly criticized use of tort law within the
employment discrimination field. Part III argues a new interpretation of
the intersection of Staub, the ADEA, and proximate cause, arguing that
the ADEA permits cat's paw liability, but that cat's paw liability under
the ADEA is not coterminous with the same concept under other
statutes. Finally, Part IV concludes that the Third Circuit's approach to
Staub's proximate cause holding to a case arising under the ADEA
provides a workable standard which should be followed by the Supreme
Court should the issue of cat's paw liability in ADEA cases be revisited.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Staub v. Proctor Hospital
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States sought to address the
growing concern with cat's paw liability cases with a decision in Staub
v. Proctor Hospital.13 This case arose under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). 14
USERRA was enacted in 1994 for a number of purposes, one of which
was "to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their service
in the uniformed services." 15 Vincent Staub was employed by Proctor
10. Lisa M. Durham Taylor, The Pro-Employee Bent of the Roberts Court, 79 TENN. L. REV.
803,832 (2012).
11. See id. at 832-34 ("[T]he context of Staub, presenting a claim under USERRA, leaves in
some doubt the applicability of cat's paw liability under... the ADEA.").
12. See id. at 833-34 (discussing a number of the circuit court decisions which had been decided
in the year following Staub). This Casenote will address these, as well as others which have occurred
since.
13. See Staub, 562 U.S. 411; see also Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
14. Staub, 562 U.S. at 415.
15. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §
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Hospital as an angiography technician until 2004, when the hospital
terminated him.16 During the time Staub was employed by the hospital,
he also participated in the United States Army Reserve.17  Two of
Staub's supervisors expressed hostility to his involvement in the
military. 18  Because of this hostility, the supervisors took numerous
negative actions against him, including issuing disciplinary warnings for
his alleged violation of hospital rules. 19 The anti-military animus held
by Staub's supervisors culminated in Staub's termination in 2004. 20 In
seeking this termination, one of Staub's supervisors complained to the
Vice President of human resources for the hospital, stating that Staub
had yet again violated a company rule. 2 1 Relying on this information,
the Vice President, who was not alleged to be hostile to Staub's
participation in the United States Army Reserve, reviewed Staub's
personnel file and ultimately terminated his employment.
22
In considering the issue of cat's paw liability in this case, the Court
sought to settle a divide between multiple circuits. 23  Determining
whether Proctor Hospital could be held liable for the actions taken by
Staub's supervisors-who were not ultimately responsible for his
termination-required the Court to turn to the causation standard of
USERRA.2 4 In relevant part, the language reads, "An employer shall be
considered to have engaged in actions prohibited .. .under subsection
(a), if the person's membership . . . is a motivating factor in the
employer's action . ,25
The Court started with the premise "that employment discrimination
is a federal tort."26 In considering this language, the Court stated, "when
Congess creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort
law. 7 Discussing this, the Court noted that "[i]ntentional torts such as
this, 'as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts, . . . generally
require that the actor intend the consequences of an act, not simply the
4301(a)(3) (2012).
16. Staub, 562 U.S. at 413.
17. Id. at413-14.
18. Id. at414.
19. Id. at414-15.
20. Id. at 415.
21. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414.
22. Id. at415.
23. Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
24. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
25. Id. at 1190-91 (quoting Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (c) (2012) (emphasis in original)).
26. Covel, supra note 1, at 178 n.189 ("The Court began its analysis of this case based on the
assertion that employment discrimination is a federal tort created by Congress and therefore principles
of tort law should govern."); Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
27. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
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act itself.' ' 28 In determining which standard to apply to cases brought
under claims of cat's paw liability, the Court first considered the basic
principles of agency law.2 9  Although the Court first noted that "the
malicious mental state of one agent cannot generally be combined with
the harmful action of another agent to hold the principle liable for a tort
that requires both," the Court then stated, "[a]nimus and responsibility
for the adverse action can both be attributed to the earlier agent... if the
adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent's
discriminatory conduct." 30  To make sense of this finding, the Court
then turned to the doctrine of proximate cause.31  In discussing the
doctrine of proximate cause, the Court noted
it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of
judgment by the decision maker does not prevent the
earlier agent's action ... from being the proximate cause
of the harm. Proximate cause requires only "some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged," and excludes only those "link[s] that
are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect." 32
Relying on this, the Court held that "if a supervisor performs an act
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to
cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause
of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under
USERRA." 33Although this case came before the Court under USERRA, 34 the
Court took careful note of the similarities between USERRA and Title
VII,35 leading scholars to conclude this decision was to be far reaching
in its application to employment discrimination cases.36 At the same
time, scholars viewed this decision as one which would create more
questions than it would answer. 37
28. Id. (internal quotations omitted and emphasis removed).
29. See Staub, 562 U.S. at418-22.
30. Id. at418-19.
31. Id. at419-20.
32. Id. at 419 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
33. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
34. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 416-17.
35. Id. at417.
36. Taylor, supra note 10, at 832-33; Sperino, supra note 7, at 5; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying
Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U.L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2012).
37. Taylor, supra note 10, at 832; Timothy P. Powderly, Limiting the Ways to Skin a Cat -An
End to the Twenty Year Perplexity of the Cat's Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor?, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 617, 621 (2012).
[VOL. 84
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B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") was enacted
in 1967. In passing this law, Congress intended to promote the
employment of the elderly "based on their ability rather than age."
39
Congress further intended to prohibit discrimination based upon age in
the workplace. 40
In Section 623 of the ADEA, Congress set forth those employment
practices that are unlawful. 41 Section 623(a) states:
(a) Employment Practices. It shall be unlawful for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to
comply with this Act.42
This section of the ADEA is similar to Section 20OOe-2(a) of Title
VII, which also sets forth unlawful employment practices. In 1991,
however, Congress altered Title VII in one significant aspect.44
With the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress included Section
2000e-m. 4 5 This section codified the "mixed-motive analysis."'4 6 The
mixed-motive analysis refers to those instances in which the defendantemployer had multiple reasons for taking an adverse employment action
38. SusAN GROVER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE
CASEBOOK 52 (2011).
39. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
40. Id. § 621(b).
41. See id. § 623; see also GROVER ET AL, supra note 38, at 52-53 (providing a discussion of the
ADEA and, more specifically, discusses section 623 of the Act).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); see also GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 52.
43. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see also Smith v. City of
Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) ("Except for the substitution of the word 'age' for the words
'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin' the language of that provision in the ADEA is identical to
that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Other provisions of the ADEA also
parallel the earlier statute."); see also GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 167-69.
44. See GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 85.
45. Id.
46. Id.
2016]
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against an employee, in particular when an employer has "one legitimate
reason and one discriminatory reason." 47 This amended section reads:
(in) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in employment practices.
Except as otherwise provided in this title [42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e et
seq.], an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.
With the inclusion of this section in Title VII, a complainant who
suffers an adverse employment action may obtain relief even if the
action was taken with a legitimate motive in addition to a discriminatory
motive.4
9
Notably, when Congress included this section in Title VII, it did not
amend the ADEA to include a similar section. The causation standard
employed by the ADEA differs significantly from Title VII's causation
standard. 51  As previously noted, the ADEA prohibits a number of
employment practices taken by employers "because of" an employee's
age. 52 In 2011, the Supreme Court, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,was asked to determine "whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence
of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed motives jury
instruction" when faced with a claim arising under the ADEA.53 With
this case, the Court was called upon to make a decision determining
whether individuals who suffered discrimination because of their age
would be able to obtain relief when their employer was able to offer a
nondiscriminatory reason for its decisions. 54 In the end, the Court made
clear the import of Congress's decision not to amend the ADEA to
include the mixed motive provision that is included in Title VII. 55
47. Id. at 74.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991); see also GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 85 (providing a
discussion on this section of the statute).
49. GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 74, 85.
50. Id. at 85.
51. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m); see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 833; see also GROVER ET AL., supra note 38, at 85.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (emphasis added); see also Sperino, supra note 7, at 20 ("Although
the first step in the ADEA disparate impact analysis is similar to that of Title VII cases, the remaining
analysis is different.").
53. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 174.
[VOL. 84
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C. Gross v. FBL Financial Services
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, plaintiff Jack Gross sought to
establish that his age played a role in the adverse employment action
taken by his employer, FBL Financial Group, Inc.56 Seeking to have the
Court interpret the ADEA to allow him to pursue a mixed motive claim,
Gross relied on the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Title VII.
57
In comparing the language of the ADEA to that of Title VII, the
Court noted, "[w]hen conducting statutory interpretation, we must be
careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different
statute without careful and critical examination." 58 The ADEA, unlike
Title VII, does not include "motivating factor" language. 59 Rather, the
ADEA states that certain actions may not be taken "because of' an
employee's age. 60  The Court also noted that Congress failed to add a
provision including the motivating factor language to the ADEA when it
amended Title VII, although it amended other provisions within the
ADEA.6 1  Noting the significance of this omission, the Court stated,
"[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
presumed to have acted intentionally.
Focusing on the language of the ADEA, the Court determined that an
individual cannot proceed on a mixed motive theory of discrimination.
63
To support this conclusion, the Court discussed the proper interpretation
64of the statute's causal standard. As previously stated, the ADEA states
that an individual cannot be discriminated against "because of such
individual's age." 65 Referencing the common definitions applied to this
language generally 66 the Court determined that "but-for" causation must
56. Id. at 170.
57. See id. at 173 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) ("Petitioner
relies on this Court's decisions construing Title VII for his interpretation of the ADEA ... In Price
Waterhouse, a plurality of the Court and two justices concurring in the judgment determined that once a
'plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that [the plaintiffs membership in a protected class] played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken [that factor] into account.'")).
58. Id. at 174 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
59. Id. at 176; see also The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623
(2012).
60. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 175.
64. Id. at 175-77.
65. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
66. Id. ("The words 'because of mean 'by reason of, on account of ... Thus, the ordinary
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that age
was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act.").
2016]
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be met under the ADEA.67
Under but-for causation, it must be found that the plaintiffs harm
would not have occurred but for the actions of the defendant. 68
Generally, "[i]f the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm had the
defendant not acted negligently, the defendant's conduct is not a factual
cause of the harm."6 9  In the ADEA context, an employer's
consideration of an individual's age is the but-for cause of the adverse
employment action if "age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to
act." 70
D. Proximate Cause
To fully understand the significance of the Supreme Court's
importation of proximate cause into the holding of Staub, one must first
understand exactly what the doctrine of proximate cause entails. 71
When considering causation at the common law, two separate issues are
measured: "cause in fact and legal or proximate cause. Factual cause
is found "when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct."73
The proximate cause of an event is the legal cause.7 4  Perhaps a
misnomer, "[t]he so-called proximate cause issue is not about causation
at all but about the appropriate scope of legal responsibility." 75 Courts
do not consider proximate cause until factual cause has been
established.76
To illustrate, consider a vacuum manufacturer. 77  The defendant in
this example manufactures a vacuum negligently, resulting in the
vacuum lacking proper suction. 78  After failing to get the vacuum to
function as it should, the owner of the vacuum takes it to be repaired.79
While taking the vacuum into the repair shop, the owner is hit by a car
67. Id. at 177.
68. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBB'S LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d ed. 2011).
69. Id.
70. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). The
Court goes on to state that, "[t]o establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the
ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse
decision. Id.
71. Sperino, supra note 7, at 4; see also Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1448.
72. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6.
73. Id. at 6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 (2010)).
74. Id.
75. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 68, at § 198.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
[VOL. 84
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and is injured. 80  Although negligence of the manufacturer in
constructing the vacuum is one of the several factual causes of the
owner's harm, many would agree that the negligence of the
manufacturer was not the proximate cause of the harm, "because the
[manufacturer's] negligence did not create or increase the risk of injury
in a vehicular collision." 81
As seen in the example, one factor of proximate cause is
foreseeability. 82 Despite the fact that leading scholars have noted this as
a general factor, 83 "courts have not arrived at a consistent concern or set
of concerns that underlie" the doctrine of proximate cause.84  The
Supreme Court recently noted the myriad of definitions that exist for the
doctrine, with such approaches including "the immediate or nearest
antecedent test; the efficient, producing cause test; the substantial factor
test; and the probable, or natural and probable, or foreseeable
consequence test." 85 With such a plethora of definitions in existence, it
should come as no surprise that the importation of proximate cause into
the world of employment discrimination left the lower courts in a state
of confusion. 86
E. The Application of the Staub Standard to the ADEA
Since the Supreme Court decided Staub v. Proctor Hospital in 2011,
a number of the circuit courts have considered the applicability of its
rule to cases arising under the ADEA. 87  A thorough analysis of this
caselaw is necessary to fully understand the approaches taken by each of
the courts. This subpart will discuss each of these cases, and the
different ways in which the circuits have approached Staub's proximate
cause holding.
80. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 68, at § 198.
81. Id.
82. See id ("The most general and pervasive approach to scope of liability or proximate cause
holds that a negligent defendant is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that conduct.").
83. Id.
84. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6.
85. Id. at 8 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2642 (2011)).
86. Powderly, supra note 37, at 621; see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 834.
87. Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Group, 726 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2013); Sims v. MVM, Inc.,
704 F.3d 1327, 1334-37 (11th Cir. 2013); Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App'x 917,
922 (5th Cir. 2012); Marcus v. PQ Corp., 458 F. App'x 207, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2012); Wojtanek v. Dist.
No. 8, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers, 435 F. App'x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011); Simmons v.
Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2011).
2016]
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1. Cat's Paw Liability Under the ADEA
In 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reason to
consider the holding of Staub in relation to an issue of age
discrimination with Sharp v. Aker Plant Services Group, Inc.
Although this issue came before the court under the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act, the court analyzed this statute with the same approach used
under the ADEA.8 9
Plaintiff Tommy Sharp started work with defendant Aker Plant
Services Group in 2003. He first worked as a contract employee for
the company and was hired full-time in 2005. 91 During 2008 and 2009,
the company was forced to lay off a number of employees due to the
cancelation of projects by customers. 92  Sharp was one of these
employees.93  In addition to other evidence, Sharp offered two
conversations as direct evidence that his supervisor, Hudson, had
terminated him because of his age.94  In these conversations, Hudson
directly stated that Sharp's age was the determining factor in his
termination. 95
In the decision the court applied the holding given in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital. While Sharp's supervisor, Hudson, was the
individual making the comments, he was not who ultimately terminated
Sharp. 97  Recognizing the holding of Staub, the court noted that an"employer may escape liability if it conducts an investigation that
uncovers justification for the adverse action that is 'unrelated to the
supervisor's original biased action.'"98 The court further noted that "the
supervisor's biased report may remain a causal factor, [making the
employer liable] if the independent investigation takes it into account
without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the
88. Sharp, 726 F.3d at 797.
89. Id. at 796-97.
90. Id. at 792.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Sharp, 726 F.3d at 792.
94. Id. at 792-93 ("The key piece of evidence for Sharp consists of two conversations with
Hudson that occurred in 2009 after Sharp was told he would be laid off... But Sharp begins by pointing
to evidence that dates to sometime before June 2006, when Hudson allegedly made comments about the
advancing age of the design group and the need to bring in younger people.").
95. Id. at 794-96.
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id. ("Although Hudson was not the ultimate decision maker, Dellinger and Atkins relied
solely on Hudson's forced rankings and recommendation of who Aker could fire without disrupting
current projects.").
98. Sharp, 726 F.3d at 797 (quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011)).
[VOL. 84
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supervisor's recommendation, entirely justified."99 As Aker had based
the termination of Sharp solely on the recommendation and rankings of
Hudson, the court determined that Hudson's remarks could serve as
direct evidence of discrimination.100
The Tenth Circuit, in Simmons v. Sykes Enterprises, also considered
the question of whether the Staub holding applies to cases arising under
the ADEA.10 1 The plaintiff, Patricia Simmons, had worked for Sykes
since 1997. l °2 Although she started as a phone technician, she later
became a technician/assistant within the Department of Human
Resources. 103 In June of 2007, Simmons began experiencing age-related
hostility from both the site director and the HR supervisor.l° 
In August of 2007, an employee at Sykes complained to the HR
supervisor that her "confidential medical information" had been
disclosed. 10 5 An investigation followed this complaint. 10 6 The regional
site manager, as well as the individuals who had been hostile towards
Simmons regarding her age, conducted the investigation. 107 After the
investigation, Simmons and a fellow employee were terminated for
disclosure of confidential information. The official termination
recommendation was given by Janice DiRose, corporate employment
counsel and senior director of HR compliance at Sykes.1o9 The
recommendation was made to Jenna Nelson, the senior vice president of
HR, who authorized the termination. 110  Prior to recommending
termination of Simmons and her fellow employee, Ms. DiRose reviewed
the statements prepared by those who had conducted the initial
investigation, and personally interviewed Ms. Simmons and her fellow
employee. 1 '
The court analyzed Simmons's case under the theory of cat's paw
liability. 112 In conducting this analysis, the court noted that the Supreme
Court had recently considered cat's paw liability in Staub v. Proctor
99. Id. (quoting Staub, 562 U.S. at 421).
100. Id. at 797-98, 802.
101. Simmons v. Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011).
102. Id. at 945.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 945-46.
105. Id. at 946.
106. Simmons, 647 F.3d at 946.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Simmons, 647 F.3d at 946.
112. Id. at 949. The court also reviewed Simmons's case for age discrimination under the
framework outlined in McDonnell-Douglas. Id. at 947-48.
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Hospital."' Thus the first step was determining whether the holding in
Staub applied to cases arising under the ADEA. 114  In making this
determination, the court noted that the language of the ADEA differs
from that in USERRA and Title VII.115 Rather than using "motivating
factor" language, "[a] plaintiff alleging age discrimination must instead
prove age was a 'but-for' cause of her termination." 116  This posed
somewhat of an issue for the court, as it noted that the motivating factor
language present in USERRA served as "the operative phrase relied
upon in Staub."'1 17 These linguistic differences proved significant in the
court's eyes: "[i]f we were to apply Staub directly to an age-
discrimination case, the plaintiff would then only need to prove her
supervisor's animus was somehow related to the termination and not
that the animus was necessary to bring about the termination." 118
Despite the difference in the language between the various statutes,
the court found that "the underlying principles of agency upon which
subordinate bias theories are based" were applicable to cat's paw cases
arising under the ADEA.119 In line with this analysis, the court noted
that, prior to Staub, the Tenth Circuit had applied the theory of cat's paw
liability to cases which arose under the ADEA. 12  The causation
standard of the ADEA, however, required a closer link "between a
subordinate's animus and the ultimate employment decision" than the
court believed would be required by the Staub standard. 121 The court
found that "even after Staub, an ADEA plaintiff seeking to hold an
employer liable through the discriminatory conduct of its subordinate
must show the subordinate's animus was a 'but-for' cause of the adverse
employment action, i.e., it was the factor that made a difference." 122
The court determined that Simmons could not show that, but for the
alleged discriminatory animus, she would not have been fired 121 and
therefore, cat's paw liability could not be shown. 124
113. Id. at 949.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 562 U.S. 411,419 (2009)).
117. Id.
118. Id. Here the court noted that Staub defined proximate cause by stating, "Proximate cause
requires only some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, and
excludes only those links that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect." Id. (quoting Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,419 (2011)).
119. Id. at 949.
120. Id. (citing Schulte v. Potter, 218 F. App'x 703, 719 (10th Cir. 2007)).
121. Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949 (citing Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.
2010)).
122. Id. at 949-50 (citing Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010)).
123. Id. at 950.
124. Id.
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Not long after the Tenth Circuit decided Simmons, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered Staub's proximate cause
holding in relation to cases arising under the ADEA with Wojtanek v.
District No. 8 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers.125 Plaintiff Mitchell Wojtanek was employed by Consolidated
Container Corporation as a maintenance mechanic for four and a half
years. 126 His employer terminated him when he was sixty-five years
old, allegedly because of his poor work performance. 127  However,
rather than bringing suit against his emplo er, this case came before the
court as a claim against Wojtanek's union. 28
Prior to his termination, Wojtanek had contacted his union steward
asking him to file a grievance related to concerns about safety.123
Wojtanek then began experiencing hostile comments related to his age
at the hands of his union steward, Zuniga. 130 These hostile comments
occurred on a number of separate occasions.131 After being terminated
by Consolidated, Wojtanek, with the aid of union official Rufus Eskew
and union steward Zuniga, underwent the union grievance process.132
Following the unsuccessful union grievance process, Wojtanek filed
suit, alleging that the union had not aided him sufficiently in his
133grievance process due to his age.
Wojtanek alleged that the negative treatment and the age-related
comments he suffered at the hands of Zuniga must be accredited to the
union official, Eskew, under the theory of cat's paw liability. 134
Wojtanek claimed that Zuniga had "negatively influenced Eskew's
advocacy by falsely reporting that he didn't want his job back." '135 The
court first addressed the holding in Staub, stating "[flor the theory to
apply, the biased actions of someone who was not the decisionmaker
must have been the proximate cause of an adverse action suffered by the
plaintiff.'' 136 Finding that, in the event Wojtanek was able to show that
Eskew was influenced by the age discrimination occurring at the handsof Zuniga, the standard in the ADEA would still not be satisfied, for, as
125. See Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers, 435 F. App'x 545,
549 (7th Cir. 2011).
126. Id. at 546.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Wojtanek, 435 F. App'x at 546.
131. Id. at 546-47.
132. Id. at547.
133. Id. at 548.
134. Id. at 549.
135. Wojtanek, 435 F. App'x at 549.
136. Id. (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,422-23 (2011)).
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in Simmons, the plaintiff is subject to a higher burden when bringing an
action under the ADEA.137 This burden required Wojtanek "show that
age was the determinative factor-not just a motivating factor .... ,138
As Wojtanek could not show that "Eskew would have represented [him]
differently 'but for' the comments made by Zuniga," the court held that
cat's paw liability could not be applied.
139
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the applicability
of Staub's proximate cause standard to cases arising under the ADEA in2012 wih Macusv. P "- . 140
2012, with Marcus v. PQ Corporation. Plaintiffs Bonnie Marcus and
Roman Wypart were employed by PQ Corporation. 14 1 Following the
sale of the company, the new CEO implemented a reduction in the
workforce. 142  This resulted in the termination of a number of
employees, including the plaintiffs. 143  The plaintiffs alleged their
inclusion in the reduction in force was based impermissibly on their
144age.
On appeal, the defendant employer alleged that the district court erred
in delivering an instruction for cat's paw liability in a case arising under
the ADEA.14 5 Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Staub, the Third
Circuit allowed plaintiffs to bring ADEA claims under the theory of
cat's paw liability. 146  Considering the viability of these claims
following Staub, the court found that the approach had not changed.
147
Although USERRA, the statute at issue in Staub, employed a less
demanding causation standard than the ADEA, the court noted "Staub is
a case about proximate cause as it relates to principles of agency and
vicarious liability. To have a viable claim under either statute using a
137. Id. at 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Simmons v. Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir.
2011)).
138. Id. at 549 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009));
Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2010)).
139. Id.
140. See Marcus v. PQ Corp., 458 F. App'x 207, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2012).
141. Id. at209-10.
142. Id. at 210.
143. Id.
144. Marcus v. PQ Corp., No. 07-2075, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16399, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17,
2011). This case came before the Third Circuit on appeal by both parties; at the district court level. "A
jury ruled in Plaintiffs favor, awarding substantial damages that were remitted by the District Court.
PQ appeals the judgement, claiming that it is entitled to either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's denial of their post-verdict motion to mold
the judgment to incorporate prejudgment interest and to account for negative consequences." Marcus,
458 F. App'x at 209.
145. Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 211.
146. Id. (citing Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Under our case
law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to
terminate.")).
147. Id.
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cat's paw theory, a plaintiff must surmount both the causation and
vicarious liability hurdles.' ' 14 8  Despite the greater difficulty the
ADEA's causation standard creates for a plaintiff to bring a cat's paw
liability case, the court referred to the statement of the Tenth Circuit in
Simmons, noting that "the underlying principles of agency upon which
subordinate bias theories are based apply equally to all types of
employment discrimination." 149  Thus, the court determined that the
district court was correct in delivering the instruction on cat's paw
liability. 150
The applicability of Staub's proximate cause holding to cases arising
under the ADEA was most recently considered in Sims v. MVM, Inc.
In December of 2007, seventy-one year old Solomon Sims, Jr. accepted
a supervisory position with MVM.15 2  His immediate supervisor was
Tom Davis.153 After Sims had worked for MVM for some time, Davis
determined that Sims's performance was unsatisfactory. 154  Due to
financial issues, the Vice President at MVM notified Perkins, the project
manager, that MVM needed fewer supervisors in March of 2008.155
Perkins delayed taking action on the matter until August of 2008, when
informed again that the number of supervisors needed to be reduced. 156
During a meeting with both Davis and Perkins, Sims was notified that
he was one of the supervisors who would be included in the layoffs. 157
During this meeting his age was referenced, though "the parties
dispute[d] who first brought it up." 158  In an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission charge of age discrimination, Sims alleged
that Davis had made numerous negative comments related to his age.
One of the arguments set forth by Sims was "that Perkins acted as a
... cat's paw for Davis[," who allegedly held a discriminatory animus
regarding Sims's age. I  In approaching the theory of cat's paw
liability, the court first needed to determine if the approach originally
taken by the Eleventh Circuit was affected by the Staub ruling. 16 1 The
148. Id. at 212.
149. Id. (quoting Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2011)).
150. Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
151. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1334-37 (1 1th Cir. 2013).
152. Id. at 1329-30.
153. Id. at 1330.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1330.
157. Id. See also id. at 1229 (explaining the acronym "RIF").
158. Id. at 1331.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1334. Within this action, Sims also argued that Perkins was a biased decision maker.
161. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335.
2016]
15
Reburn: Staub v. Proctor Hospital and the Age Discrimination in Employmen
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
court noted the textual differences between the ADEA and USERRA,
the statute considered in Staub."' With "but-for" causation language,
"the ADEA requires more than what must ordinarily be proven under an
analogous Title VII or USERRA action."' 163 Rather, "a 'but-for' cause
requires a closer link than mere proximate causation; it requires that the
proscribed animus have a determinative influence on the employer's
adverse decision."' 164 Based upon the higher causation standard required
by the ADEA, the court followed the Tenth Circuit, determining that
"the 'proximate causation' standard does not apply to cat's paw cases
involving age discrimination."' 165
Despite the fact that Staub's proximate cause rule would not apply,
the court noted that "Staub is primarily a case about agency principles
and vicarious liability. ,,166 Indeed, the court noted that the Eleventh
Circuit's prior cat's paw liability caselaw suggested that it was
appropriate "to apply agency principles in determining vicarious liability
of an employer." Ultimately, the court found it unnecessary to decide
if Staub modified its prior approach to cat's paw liability under the
ADEA "with respect to agency principles as they relate to scienter."' 16
8
Even assuming "arguendo that the Staub standard with respect to such
agency principles" applied, Sims could not show that Davis's
discriminatory animus was the "but-for" cause of Perkins's decision to
terminate him. 169
2. The Death of the Cat's Paw?
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider
the application of Staub's proximate cause holding to cases arising
under the ADEA in August of 2012 with Holliday v. Commonwealth
Brands, Inc. 170 Tilden Holliday was hired by Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. (CBI) in 2001 at the age of forty-eight. 171 Throughout his time with
CBI, Holliday received multiple reprimands for poor performance in the
workplace. 172  Many came from his supervisor, Loren Trauth.
173
162. Id. at 1335-36.
163. Id. at 1336 (citing Simmons v. Sykes Enters. Inc., 647 F. 3d 943, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2011)).
164. Id. at 1335-36 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
165. Id. at 1336 (citing Simmons, 647 F. 3d at 949-50).
166. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1336-37.
170. See Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App'x 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2012).
171. Id. at 918.
172. See id. at 919-20.
173. See id.
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Holliday claimed these reprimands were "part of a plan developed by
Trauth to 4 get him fired and have him replaced with someone
younger." To support this claim, Holliday reported multiple
occasions where Trauth referenced his age. 175 Holliday was later fired
by Hoke Whitworth, Trauth's supervisor, and Bonita McIntyre, the
Human Resources Manager. 176 Ultimately, Whitworth determined that
Holliday needed to be terminated based upon information given to him
by Trauth. 177
This case came before the Fifth Circuit on Holliday's claims under
the ADEA. 178  The court ultimately determined that it could not find
cat's paw liability as Holliday did not offer "any evidence showing that
Trauth had 'influence or leverage' over" those making the ultimate
termination decision. 179 In coming to this decision, the court assumed
that cat's paw liability, as applied prior to Staub, was available for
claims arising under the ADEA. 18  However, the court then revealed
concern with the viability of these claims in a footnote. 181 The judges of
the Fifth Circuit noted that, in deciding Staub, the Supreme Court paid
careful attention to the phrase "motivating factor in the employer's
action. 182  This language, however, is not present in the ADEA. 183
Recognizing the potential import of these differences, the Fifth Circuit
stated:
Because the "motivating factor" phrase is not in the
ADEA, and because the Court construed that phrase in
recognizing "cat's paw" liability under USERRA, and
finally, because the Court has focused closely on the text
of the antidiscrimination statutes in authorizing theories
of liability, it could very well be that our prior
recognition of "cat's paw" liability under the ADEA was
incorrect. 184
174. Id. at 919.
175. Holliday, 483 F. App'x at 919.
176. Id. at 920.
177. See id. at 919-20. Trauth sent multiple memos to Whitford detailing Mr. Holliday's poor
performance in the workplace. Id.
178. Id. at918.
179. Id. at921-22.
180. Holliday, 483 F. App'x at 922 (Holliday "relies on Palasola v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342
F.3d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 2003), in arguing that age-related remarks by someone other than the formal
decision-maker are probative of the employer's discriminatory intent if that person is in a position to
influence the decision. Assuming that this "cat's paw" theory of liability is available under the
ADEA .... ).
181. Id. at 922n.2.
182. Id. (quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011)).
183. Id. See also The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
184. Holliday, 482 F. App'x at 922 n.2.
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With this footnote, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the muddied waters
created by Staub in cat's paw cases arising under the ADEA. 185
III. DISCUSSION
With Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme Court opened the door
to a wide variety of problems to inevitably arise from attempted
application of the rule's interpretation. 186 This Part will first discuss the
scholarly criticism of the doctrine of proximate cause as generally
applied to statutes. This Part will then discuss the highly criticized
application of the doctrine to the field of employment discrimination.
This Part will argue that, if approached correctly, the proximate cause
holding of Staub could be applied to cases arising under the ADEA.
This Part will finally suggest that this application is shown in the Third
Circuit's decision in Marcus v. PQ Corporation. This Casenote will
ultimately find that the approach taken by the Third Circuit provides a
workable standard, should the Supreme Court revisit cat's paw liability
cases in the context of the ADEA.
A. Proximate Cause and Employment Discrimination
The Supreme Court's encounter with cat's paw liability in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital had been long awaited by the lower federal courts. 18 7
Rather than provide clarity in an area rife with unclear approaches, 188
the Court increased confusion by imputing proximate cause into the
world of employment discrimination. As leading scholars in the field
of employment discrimination have noted, "there is perhaps nothing in
the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or
upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion," than the
doctrine of proximate cause. 190
Setting aside for a moment the context of employment discrimination,
scholar Sandra Sperino has noted that the doctrine of proximate cause in
general is problematic for a variety of reasons. 19 1 First, the concernsthat underlie the doctrine of proximate cause are not uniform across the
185. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 833-34.
186. Id. at 832.
187. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1434.
188. Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
189. Id. at 160; Sperino, supra note 7, at 5-6; Taylor, supra note 10, at 832; Powderly, supra note
37, at 621.
190. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 263 (W. Page Keeton Ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
191. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6.
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courts. 1 9 2 Second, despite the vast amount of definitions and approaches
taken, "proximate cause inherently relates to policy decisions about
where liability should end."'193  Each of the different approaches
provides a "preference about where the line should be drawn.",114 Third,
the goals behind applying doctrine are constantly in flux, evolving over
time. 195  "Finally, courts vary the use of proximate cause in tort cases,
depending on whether the underlying tort is intentional."
196
As discussed previously, the theory of proximate cause has been
defined in many ways.19  When seeking to apply this theory, each
respective court is influenced significantly by the elements of the tort
with which it is dealing. 198 These elements, depending upon which tort
the court is faced with, shape, and ultimately determine, the definition of
proximate cause the court chooses to apply. 199  In addition to the
elements of the tort, courts are also influenced by the underlying policy
concerns and goals that come with the case. 20 Scholars studying the
theory of proximate cause have asserted that the theory, in and of itself,
201cannot be independently defined.
The primary area of tort law to which the doctrine of proximate cause,. 202
has been applied is that of negligence. In intentional tort cases,
"[p]roximate cause rarely plays a decisive role." 20 3  As noted by
scholars, only a small number of cases involving intentional torts deal
with multiple causes. 204  Additionally, courts have fewer issues
determining the scope of liability when the conduct was clearly intended
to cause harm.20 5 Despite the plethora of definitions used when seeking
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6.
197. Id. at 6-8. As found by Sperino, "[s]ome courts use proximate cause to determine whether
some intervening action cuts off the original actor's liability. In thinking about superseding cause, the
court is often determining that the acts of a third party interrupt the sequence of conduct, consequence,
and injury between the defendant and plaintiff such that liability of the defendant is no longer
appropriate." Id. at 7.
198. Id. at 7, 9.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 7.
201. Sperino, supra note 7, at 7, 9 (quoting Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence
Law, 28 TEx. L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1950)) ("At least one commentator has asserted that proximate cause
has no inherent meaning, but substitutes for other elements of a cause of action when the decision on
that element is difficult.").
202. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1459; see also Sperino, supra note 7, at 10.
203. Sperino, supra note 7, at 10.
204. Id. at 10 (citing Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud,
94 IOWA L. REv. 811, 832 (2009)).
205. Sperino, supra note 7, at 10.
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to define the theory of proximate cause, one common theme stands out:
each of the definitions serve to aid the court in determining the scope of
liability for a given harm. 206  When the cause of the harm is readily
apparent, as is often the case with intentional torts, "the necessity and
strength of proximate cause doctrine severely diminishes. '" 20 7
The complexity of the doctrine of proximate cause is only increased
when considered in the context of employment discrimination. 20 8
Notably, the doctrine was not necessary for the Staub Court to use in
reaching its decision.20 9 Had the Court simply relied on "cause in fact"
the result would have been the same. 2 1  Furthermore, "it appears that
the Court reaches for proximate cause because it is concerned that it
might be unfair to hold employers liable in all instances when biased
conduct somehow factually causes an employment decision. ' 211 Further
negative effects of the holding in Staub can be identified regarding its
application to the ADEA.212
B. Proximate Cause and the ADEA
The use of proximate cause has led to immense confusion in the
context of the ADEA.2 13 When applied, the doctrine of proximate cause
focuses heavily on the elements of the underlying cause of action
brought before the court. 2 14  The consideration of the cat's paw cases
brought under the ADEA required each respective court to consider the
"but-for" causation standard of the ADEA.2 15  When Staub's holding
was brought into the discussion, the majority of the courts struggled to
reconcile the language of the ADEA with the doctrine of proximate
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 10.
208. Sperino, supra note 7, at 3; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1448.
209. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1457; see also Sperino, supra note 7, at 5 n.18 (noting in a
footnote that "[t]he proximate cause language in Staub is arguably dicta, because the case's core issue
relates to factual cause.").
210. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1457-58.
211. Sperino, supra note 7, at 5-6.
212. Taylor, supra note 10, at 832-33.
213. Id. at 832-34; see also Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1434; Sperino, supra note 7, at 3.
214. Sperino, supra note 7, at 7, 9.
215. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009); Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Group,
Inc., 726 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 393-94
(6th Cir. 2008) ("Age discrimination claims brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act are analyzed
in the same manner as ADEA claims.")); Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335-37 (1 lth Cir. 2013);
Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App'x 917, 921 (5th Cir. 2012); Marcus v. PQ Corp.,
458 F. App'x 207, 211-212 (3d Cir. 2012); Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero.
Workers, F. App'x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011); Simmons v. Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 949-50 (10th Cir.
2011).
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cause. 2 16  For example, in Simmons v. Sykes Enterprises, Inc, when
determining whether the Staub holding applied, the court stated, "[i]f we
were to apply Staub directly to an age-discrimination case, the plaintiff
would then only need to prove her supervisor's animus was somehow
related to the termination and not that the animus was necessary to bring
about the termination. '' 2 17  Judges sitting in the circuit courts failed to
realize that the proximate cause holding of Staub actually could be
applied to the causation standard of the ADEA to resolve cat's paw
cases.2
18
Despite the fact that there are multiple explanations, the doctrine of
proximate cause primarily focuses on where, in a course of events,
liability should cease. 2 19  In considering this, the elements of the
underlying cause of action play a major role. 22  In the case of issues
arising under the ADEA, a plaintiff must be able to show "but-for"
causation.22 1  In defining "but-for" causation, respected scholars have
noted, "[i]f the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm had the
defendant not acted negligently, the defendant's conduct is not a factual
cause of the harm.'222 Considering the doctrine of proximate cause, the
various definitions given to proximate cause are "hopelessly tied up in
goals and policies related to the underlying cause of action." 223  Thus,
rather than applying the doctrine of proximate cause as applied in1 224Staub, this interpretation would result in applying the doctrine with
the ADEA's policy goals in mind, finding liability only where the
consideration of the plaintiffs age by the supervisor was the "but-for"
cause of the adverse employment action ultimately taken by the non-
biased supervisor. 22 5  This application of the Staub holding would
216. See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335-36; Holliday, 483 F. App'x at 922; Wojtanek, 435 F. App'x at
549; Simmons, 647 F.3d at 1335-36; see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 833-34.
217. Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949.
218. See Covel, supra note 1, at 183 ("In cases after Staub, many employees seeking to proceed
on a cat's paw theory have not realized the potential benefit of the proximate cause standard because
lower courts' over-reliance on the facts in Staub have narrowed the circumstances in which Staub would
apply.").
219. Sperino, supra note 7, at 6.
220. Id. at 7, 9.
221. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); see Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
222. DOBBS ETAL., supra note 68, at § 186.
223. Sperino, supra note 7, at 7; see also Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 1203 (2013) [hereinafter Statutory Proximate Cause].
224. Covel, supra note 1, at 183; see also Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 223, at 1237
("[I]f a court uses one rationale to apply proximate cause to a statutory regime, it does not follow that
the court can then use the same reasoning to read a different rationale into another statute.").
225. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); see also Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009); Simmons v. Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 949-50 (10th
Cir. 2011) ("Thus, even after Staub, an ADEA plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable through the
21
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comport with the holding of Gross v. FBL Financial Services.226
Although the majority of the circuits ultimately came to this conclusion,
requiring but-for causation be met, 227 the idea that such could not be
done when applying proximate cause is incorrect. 228
This is most appropriately illustrated by the court in Marcus v. PQ
Corporation.229  Though the Marcus decision has been interpreted as
determining that Staub's proximate case holding does not apply to cat's
paw liability cases arising under the ADEA,23° the court notes,
[a]lthough USERRA imposes a more lenient causation
requirement than does the ADEA, Staub is a case about
proximate cause as it relates to principles of agency and
vicarious liability. To have a viable claim under either
statute using a cat's paw theory, a plaintiff must
surmount both the causation and vicarious liability
hurdles. 231
Here the court was able to approach the Staub holding in a sensible
manner, while additionally maintaining the proper reverence to the
previous Supreme Court holdings regarding the age discrimination
statute. Additionally, as can be inferred from the above quotation, it
seems that in doing so, the court was able to separate cause in fact from
proximate cause. 233 As noted by scholars, "[s]ince proximate cause is
essentially about limiting liability, courts must consider these other
provisions when determining the appropriate space, if any, for
proximate cause to operate within the statutory regime." 234 In line with
this, the court was careful to note that one must still overcome the
necessary causation in order to bring a claim. 235  Causation is simplymore difficult to meet due to the holding in Gross v. FBL Financial
discriminatory conduct of its subordinate must show the subordinate's animus was a 'but-for' cause of
the adverse employment action .. "); Covel, supra note 1, at 183.
226. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-77; see also Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949-50.
227. See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335-37 (11th Cir. 2013); Holliday v.
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App'x 917, 921-22 (5th Cir. 2012); Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers, 435 F. App'x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011); Simmons v. Sykes
Enters., 647 F.3d 943,949-50 (10th Cir. 2011).
228. See Covel, supra note 1, at 183 ("In cases after Staub, many employees seeking to proceed
on a cat's paw theory have not realized the potential benefit of the proximate cause standard because
lower courts over-reliance on the facts in Staub have narrowed the circumstances in which Staub would
apply."); Marcus v. PQ Corp., 458 F. App'x 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2012).
229. See Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
230. Larison v. Northern Kentucky Univ., No. 2013-CA-001721-MR, 2016 WL 1069130, at *8
(Ken. Ct. App. March 18, 2016).
231. Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
232. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177; Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
233. See Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
234. Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 223, at 1226.
235. See Marcus, 458 F. App'x at 212.
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Services-"but-for" causation must be met under the ADEA.236 Based
upon this analysis, if the Supreme Court reconsidered cat's paw liability
under the ADEA and determined that the proximate cause holding is to
continue, the Marcus court's approach would offer the ability to apply
proximate cause in the proper manner-separate from the factual
causation standard necessary in the ADEA.2 3
7
IV. CONCLUSION
When the justices of the Supreme Court sat down to consider Staub v.
Proctor Hospital in 2011, they sat down intending to settle a split
238among the circuits. By referencing the similarities between USERRA
and Title VII, the Court led many to believe that the decision was to be
wide sweeping in its applicability to employment discrimination
statutes.239 By including the doctrine of proximate cause in the holding,
the court included a ticking time bomb, one recognized by Justice Alito
in his concurrence: "[t]he Court's ... approach ... is almost certain to
lead to confusion and is likely to produce results that will not serve the
interests of either employers or employees ... ,240 Although the
doctrine of proximate cause can, in fact, be applied to cat's paw liability
cases arising under the ADEA, Staub's damage is already done.
24 1
Were the Supreme Court to reconsider cat's paw liability in the context
of the ADEA, the Marcus decision would be the proper place to begin.
236. Id. See also Gross, 557 U.S. at 177.
237. Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 223, at 1202; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 68,
at §198; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1457.
238. Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
239. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1435-36; see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 833; Sperino, supra
note 7, at 5.
240. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 426 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Taylor,
supra note 10, at 832.
241. Powderly, supra note 37, at 621 ("[T]he Supreme Court failed to provide much guidance to
the courts, and instead, created more questions than answers. Left most bewildered by this decision are
the modem employers who face tremendous uncertainty in the wake of this landmark decision."); see
also Taylor, supra note 10, at 832; Covel, supra note 1, at 160.
2016]
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